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Abstract 
Recent research highlights the importance of non-governmental organizations in environmental 
enforcement. These studies largely describe the operations of enforcement organizations locally. 
The present study offers an alternative perspective by considering environmental enforcement by 
international non-governmental organizations (or INGOs). We employ the treadmill of 
production thesis to investigate the formation of environmental enforcement INGOs between 
1950 and 2010. Prais–Winsten estimation techniques are used to investigate whether the 
formation of environmental enforcement INGOs is correlated with the global ecological 
footprint, gross world product, and/or organization density. Results confirm that there is no 
correlation between the ecological footprint and INGO formation. There is, however, 
considerable evidence of an inverted-U association between density and founding (p<0.05). This 
discovery is important because it provides strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the 
global environmental enforcement culture is shaped by competitive neoliberal tendencies. 
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Introduction 
Criminal justice scholars have recently highlighted the relationship between non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and environmental enforcement (Green, Ward, & 
McConnachie, 2007; Nurse, 2013; van Solinge, 2010; White, 2012). Importantly, the scholarship 
produced by criminal justicians calls for a better understanding of the impact of environmental 
enforcement NGOs and the reasons for their formation, with most studies concentrating on the 
formation, operation and influence of select domestic organizations. International non-
governmental organizations (or INGOs) that are focused on environmental enforcement are 
largely excluded from these criminal justice discussions. The omission of INGOs from the 
criminal justice literature on environmental enforcement is interesting because environmental 
crime is often regarded as global in nature (White, 2013). As a result, this study directs attention 
to the formation of environmental enforcement INGOs (or EE-INGOs). 
Studying the formation of EE-INGOs allows us to contribute to knowledge in the area of 
globalization in three important ways. First, determining whether the formation of EE- INGOs is 
expanding or contracting over time allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions about the 
global culture of environmental enforcement. That is, if a critical mass of EE-INGOs is 
developing, there may be significant opportunities for these organizations to pool their resources 
to advance common environmental interests and jointly tackle global environmental crime.1 
Second, determining whether potential patterns in EE-INGO formation are correlated with global 
indicators of economic growth and/or environmental degradation provides insight into the 
                                                 
1 The optimistic assumption is that EE-INGOs will come together to leverage their resources as they expand. This is, 
of course, an empirical question. That is, there may be opportunities for EE-INGOs to increase their collective 
influence on common environmental issues as they expand. However, it may also be the case that EE-INGOs are 
less effective as they expand because they compete for scarce resources. 
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underlying conditions that give rise to this area of global polity. That is, empirical analyses can 
help determine whether, on aggregate, these organizations are more strongly associated with 
economic opportunities or to threats to global environmental sustainability. Third, scholars of 
non-profit globalization have suggested that NGOs are increasingly subject to neoliberal market-
based approaches that demand that they compete for financial donors and government contracts 
in an era of ‘venture philanthropy’ (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Frumkin, 2003; Wallace, 2009). 
Thus, studying formation trends in relation to the number of existing organizations allows us to 
assess whether INGOs may be subject to neoliberal constraints as the formation of these 
organizations may be limited by their own growth (Cooley & Ron, 2002; Carroll & Hannan, 
2000). 
We begin by exploring the basic role of INGOs in global culture. That discussion 
provides the backdrop to our theoretical arguments that draw upon the treadmill of production 
thesis to explain why EE-INGOs may form. This literature suggests that environmental 
organizations find it hard to advocate for environmental sustainability because they are born and 
defined by global forces of capitalism (Schnaiberg, 1980). Finally, we examine EE-INGO 
formation at the global level by looking at the patterns of formation relative to patterns of 
environmental degradation, global economic growth and organizational competition. 
Background 
The expression ‘non-governmental organization’ (NGO) is tied to Article 71 (Chapter 10) 
of the United Nations Charter of 1945, which notes, ‘The Economic and Social Council may 
make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are 
concerned with matters within its competence.’ Today the term ‘non-governmental organization’ 
is common, and is used to describe one important set of organizational actors that are part of a 
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global culture. Nevertheless, the application of NGO as a label is contested, for example, when 
organizations are defined according to values. As a result, there are often significant 
disagreements about the definition of NGOs based on the issues they address and the strategies 
they use. Despite these disagreements, however, researchers such as Willetts (2010) suggest that 
there is some consensus among scholars concerning the general definition of NGOs. Specifically, 
Willetts (2010, p.31) states that an NGO is ‘any organized group of people that are not direct 
agents of individual governments, not pursuing criminal activities, not engaged in violent 
activities, and not primarily established for profit-making purposes.’ This definition makes it 
possible to empirically study NGOs, but it is still difficult to determine how many exist. 
Fortunately, at the international scale of analysis, organizations such as the Union of 
International Associations (UIA) monitor NGOs to facilitate better international cooperation 
among various global actors. In its Yearbook of International Organizations, the UIA has kept 
track of these organizations for nearly a century, and their documents suggest that INGOs have 
existed in some form since at least the mid-1800s (Boli & Thomas, 1997). 
From a globalization perspective, INGOs are important indicators and outcomes of global 
culture. First, INGOs bridge the gap between public and private institutions in a way that helps to 
define culture (Teegen, 2003). They may not be able to directly create or make laws, but, as 
Bennett (2012, p. 801) observes, they may have sufficient power ‘to push around the largest 
governments and rival corporate adversaries.’ As agents of global culture, then, INGOs can 
influence global norms when participating in governance and politics through consultation with 
IGOs, states and corporations. Moreover, INGOs can bring legal cases forward to various 
international bodies and also engage in global communication efforts using global media such as 
the internet to draw attention to problematic social issues (Willetts, 2010). 
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Second, global culture, particularly global neoliberalism, may influence how INGOs 
emerge and operate (Wallace, 2009). It is the formation of INGOs that interests us. Indeed, these 
organizations may easily be viewed as manifestations of globalization that reflect an intensified 
neoliberal polity (Carroll & Jarvis, 2015). Importantly, we suggest that INGO formation follows 
materialist patterns of production and competition and thus is more likely to be influenced by 
economic conditions than by the need to respond to alarming environmental harms.  
Studies suggest rapid growth in the number of INGOs in recent years (Bennett, 2012). 
Boli and Thomas (1997) examined INGO expansion by following trends in INGOs listed in the 
Yearbook of International Organizations. They found that the number of active INGOs increased 
from 200 in 1900, to 800 by 1930, to more than 2,000 by 1960, and to nearly 4,000 in 1980. 
While the number of INGOs has increased, the focus of the INGO sector has also changed. 
Importantly, environmental INGOs have become more visible (Schofer & Hironaka, 2005). 
Murdie and Davis (2012, p. 180) recently found that 1,019 of the 4,378 INGOs they studied were 
focused on environmental concerns. As Conrad and Hilchey (2011, p. 273) make clear, 
‘[w]orldwide, decision-makers and non-governmental organizations are increasing their use of 
citizen volunteers to enhance their ability to monitor and manage natural resources, track species 
at risk, and conserve protected areas.’ 
Here, we are interested in a small subset of environmental organizations that focus 
directly on enforcement (i.e., EE-INGOs). These environmental enforcement organizations often 
use employees to advocate for the creation of more stringent environmental regulations and 
criminal statutes as well as better crime monitoring, implementation and enforcement of laws 
and regulations currently on the books. Drawing on economic arguments, we seek to determine 
whether global indicators of income and completion are correlated with the formation of 
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environmental enforcement INGOs. In doing so, we address two questions. First, are EE-INGOs 
forming as a consequence of the disturbing trend in unsustainable consumption of the earth’s 
natural resources (McCormick, 1991)? Or, second, does organizational formation reflect general 
trends in worldwide economic growth (Waterman, 1998)? Significantly, as noted above, the 
more critical NGO literature suggests that INGOs may be limited by neoliberal tendencies as 
they are forced to compete for scarce resources to support their existence. 
The Formation of Environmental Enforcement INGOs 
We draw upon the treadmill of production (ToP) thesis to contextualize our empirical 
examination of the formation of EE-INGOs (Schnaiberg, 1980). Specifically, the ToP argument 
emphasizes that ecological degradation takes place as a result of a global capitalist system that 
constantly accelerates economic growth and consequently increases natural resource withdrawals 
and pollution (Schnaiberg, 1980). The treadmill thesis demonstrates that corporations and the 
state have an incentive to pursue economic growth (i.e., treadmill policies) despite environmental 
costs (Gould, Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2008). Within the treadmill thesis, however, there is 
potential for citizen workers to intervene by pressuring the state to place constraints on 
production (Gould, Schnaiberg, & Weinberg, 1996; Stretesky, Long & Lynch, 2014), which may 
influence the growth of EE-INGOs and their participation in state policy-making, lobbying 
efforts to change laws, and actions such as filing court cases against potential violators (Crack, 
2013). These actions expand the net of state control over environmental crime and its definition. 
In short, there is reason to believe that citizen activism may promote the expansion of EE-
INGOs. 
However, the treadmill thesis also suggests that, in the aggregate, formal organizations 
such as environmental INGOs have yet to do much to stop the acceleration of environmental 
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degradation (Gould, Schnaiberg, & Weinberg, 1996).2 As treadmill theorists note, the 
environmental movement has been unable to pressure the state to change policies because it is 
constrained by capitalist hegemony associated with funding sources and ideology produced 
within a global capitalist system (Gould, Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2008). Specifically, 
organizations such as EE-INGOs are shaped by global economics and compete with one another 
for resources in a neoliberal non-governmental market. 
It is within this treadmill perspective of optimism and despair that we examine the 
formation of EE-INGOs as a reflection of global culture and economy to determine what 
conditions may give rise to their formation. To do so we examine trends in the formation of 
environmental enforcement INGOs in the context of ecological impact, global production and 
the INGO marketplace. We examine each concept in turn. 
Ecological Impact. Foster, Clark and York (2011) suggest that capital accumulation 
relies on accelerated production and therefore creates a condition that is unsustainable and 
threatens the biosphere. Within the global economic framework the enhanced pace of production 
influences the rate of natural resource withdrawals as producers expand the withdrawal of natural 
resources to manufacture commodities. This ‘treadmill’ has environmental consequences 
because it increases and intensifies extraction through, for example, mining, drilling and 
harvesting (Schnaiberg, 1980). The social and ecological damage caused by extraction 
techniques is extensively documented in case studies and empirical research in several 
disciplines (e.g., Aigbedion & Iyayi, 2007; Bell & York, 2010; Clark, Jorgenson, & Auberach, 
2012; Elberling et al., 2007; Green, Ward, & McConnachie, 2007; Jorgenson, 2006, 2003; 
                                                 
2 INGOs represent the more formal portion of the global environmental movement. Many INGOs have well-defined 
hierarchical authority structures, written policies and procedures and established communications channels.  These 
organizations also rely on financial resources to hire and reward employees, including administrative staff, who 
follow established job descriptions in order to further INGO goals and objectives (Udy, 1959). 
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Jorgenson & Clark, 2011; van Solinge, 2008, 2010). Importantly, withdrawals that are used in 
production are closely related to levels of pollution (or ecological additions) because waste is 
released into the environment during the production process. Some of this waste has significant 
consequences for the biosphere as it drives us closer to planetary boundaries that, if crossed, may 
signal an end to life on earth as we know it (Rockström & Klum, 2015). 
One way that the ecological impact of humans on the earth can be measured is through 
the concept of the ‘ecological footprint’ (Wackernagel & Rees, 1998). The footprint is measured 
by determining the amount of land area it takes to support the extraction of natural resources and 
absorb the waste created in production. The ecological footprint suggests that we consume 
approximately 1.6 earths to support present levels of global production. Because there is no such 
thing as 1.6 earths, we exceed what the earth can sustainably produce and use up nature’s capital 
(i.e., the stock of the earth that produces raw materials). Thus, data on the ecological footprint 
demonstrate that humans are using natural resources and polluting the environment at a greater 
rate than the earth can process. The footprint provides a global indicator of environmental 
degradation over time and reflects the material conditions of the environment, which may 
generate grievances that drive organizing efforts that may be framed within an environmental 
crime and deviance perspective (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 2008). 
We draw on the optimistic portions of the treadmill thesis to hypothesize that as the 
global challenge to sustainability intensifies, more EE-INGOs will form to combat the perceived 
problem of environmental crime driven by neoliberal economic policies that threaten ecological 
sustainability (Gould, Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2008; see also Parvu, 2016). In this view, relative 
ecological deprivation should encourage the formation of EE-INGOs because perceptions about 
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the importance of ecological sustainability diverge from reality.3 Importantly, data reflecting 
ecological threats may create the background factors that give rise to the formation of EE-INGOs 
as part of a larger environmental social movement and global culture (McAdam, McCarthy, & 
Zald, 2008; Meyer et al., 1997). As a result, our first hypothesis suggests that the consumption of 
the earth’s resources is positively associated with the formation of environmental enforcement 
INGOs over time. Thus, when the ecological footprint increases, a greater number of EE-INGOs 
will form to combat this trend. 
World Production. A global political economy of production suggests that workers and 
the state have an interest in accelerating production to support capitalist accumulation tendencies 
(Schnaiberg, 1980; see also Marx, 1977 [1867]). Technology can aid in capital accumulation.4 
Workers may support technological change that threatens the environment because they are 
promised that they may keep their jobs if they become more efficient (Bell & York, 2010). States 
support production because it generates revenue that can be used for social services (Gould, 
Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2008). Opposition to production practices may come from the 
environmental movement and its organizations. However, at least a portion of the wealth needed 
to support the salaries of INGOs (their workers and campaigns) must come from private 
philanthropists who have derived their donations from capitalism itself (Ruggiero, 2013). As a 
result, the increase in global world production may set the stage for environmental enforcement 
INGOs to form because of that wealth. For instance, production-related income is likely a 
                                                 
3 We define relative ecological deprivation as the difference between citizen workers’ (see Gould, Schnaiberg, & 
Weinberg, 1996) perceptions and expectations of the performance of global environmental governance policies. 
When performance expectations are well below perceptions about actual performance then there is a significant 
level of ecological deprivation. 
4 Marx (1977 [1867], p. 492) suggests that ‘like every other instrument for increasing the productivity of labour, 
machinery is intended to cheapen commodities and, by shortening the part of the working day in which the worker 
works for himself, to lengthen the other part, the part he gives to the capitalist for nothing.’  
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necessary component for the formation of INGOs. Thus, in an era of venture philanthropy it is 
likely that production is at least indirectly responsible for the financial support of EE-INGOs. 
One way to measure production-related income is with gross world product (GWP), which 
measures the total size of the world economy as the combined gross national product of all 
countries in the world. Our second hypothesis examines the more cynical nature of the treadmill 
thesis and suggests that overall levels of production-based wealth are positively associated with 
the formation of environmental enforcement INGOs over time. Such a finding would lead us to 
question whether a global environmental enforcement culture could ever effectively challenge 
treadmill policies. 
Neoliberal Enforcement Culture. Neoliberalism describes the tendency to transfer what 
are typically considered public services to the private sector. Global environmental enforcement 
is one such area where neoliberal policies may be especially relevant. EE-INGOs are arguably 
taking over state functions on a global level. This is especially true as INGOs are deeply reliant 
on private funding (Crack, 2013; Wallace, 2009). For example, Crack (2013, p. 297) observes 
that ‘the motivations of the INGO are instrumental and reactive: they seek to appease 
governments and donors. . . . This is short-sighted and, at worst, self-defeating.’ As a result, the 
treadmill perspective challenges the notion that non-local organizations such as INGOs will 
oppose treadmill tendencies because they are beholden to market competition and private 
funding sources that serve elite policy interests (Pellow & Brulle, 2005; Ruggiero, 2013; Gould, 
Schnaiberg, & Weinberg, 1996; see also Harvey, 2005). A reliance on competition for elite 
funding may therefore serve to spread the philosophies and strategies that ultimately serve to 
support the global treadmill agenda. Thus, INGOs may behave in a way that is consistent with 
private capital. The concept of density dependence can be situated within a treadmill framework 
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to examine the tendency for potential competition in the civil sector. We therefore draw upon the 
density dependence thesis (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) to supplement observations by non-profit 
scholars that the NGO market is increasingly subject to neoliberal development in an era of 
venture philanthropy. 
The theory of density dependence emphasizes neoliberal notions of markets and income. 
According to Carroll and Hannan (2000), density dependence can best be described in two 
stages. In the first stage a few existing organizations promote the development of other similar 
organizations by providing ideological space that legitimates their existence. In mathematical 
terms, adding an organization to an organizational sector increases the legitimacy of the sector, 
and so the probability that subsequent organizations will develop increases. In the second stage 
of density dependence theory this relationship changes because there are too many organizations 
in the sector and they begin to compete for resources and people. As a result, in this stage the 
probability that a new organization will develop in this global market decreases as each 
additional organization is added to the sector. Empirical research suggests that an inverted-U 
pattern exists when examining the association between density and founding among samples of 
non-profit organizations (Minkoff, 1997; Nownes, 2010; Stretesky, Huss, & Lynch, 2012).  
The extension of density dependence theory leads us to question whether neoliberal 
policies drive the formation of environmental enforcement INGOs. To examine whether existing 
environmental enforcement organizations may limit future sector development (i.e., whether an 
international organizational ‘ceiling’ has developed), we rely on density dependence theory to 
create two testable hypotheses. Thus, the third hypothesis suggests that during the early stages of 
INGO formation there is a positive correlation between organization density (i.e., the number of 
existing organizations) and the number of environmental enforcement INGOs founded as 
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investors rush to donate to a new emerging INGO sector. Once competition for resources is 
established, however, we suggest a fourth hypothesis: that there is a negative correlation 
between organizational density and the number of environmental enforcement INGOs founded. 
Taken together, these two hypotheses can be modeled in non-linear terms through a quadratic 
term in regression.5 Importantly, if the quadratic term is statistically significant and inversely 
associates with the formation of INGOs, then evidence suggests that these particular actors in the 
global culture are limited by neoliberalism and cannot produce the critical mass needed to 
contribute to global environmental change. 
Data and Methods 
We analyze environmental enforcement INGO founding as a function of ecological 
footprints, global world income and organization density annually for the years 1950 to 2010 
(n=61). Because this is a time series analysis, we correct for problems of serial correlation in 
these data as noted below. The data used to construct the dependent variable ‘founding’ and 
independent variable ‘density’ come from three primary sources that list international 
organizations: (1) the Encyclopedia of International Organizations (Gale Research Group, 1997–
2010), (2) the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations, 
2001–2010) and (3) the World Directory of Environmental Organizations (International Union 
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1992, 1996, 2001). We selected these sources 
in order to compile a list of potential EE-INGOs that formed between 1950 and 2010. The 
Encyclopedia of International Organizations includes over 30,000 national and multinational 
organizations from around the world and is structured according to broad categories that describe 
                                                 
5 This effect can be modeled in ordinary least squares regression as: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 − 𝛽2𝑥𝑡
2 + 𝑒. This equation 
estimates the number of organizations founded in time (yt) by calculating the partial slope coefficients for β1 and β2 
given the number of existing organizations (xt), correcting for any omitted variables and error in measurement (e). 
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the sectors in which the organizations operate. Encyclopedia entries contain important 
information such as mission statements, the countries in which the organizations are 
headquartered, and the year in which the organizations were established. The Yearbook of 
International Organizations lists nearly 66,000 international organizations and also contains 
information on those organizations, including the year in which they were founded and their 
missions. Finally, the Directory of Environmental Organizations provides information on 
environmental non-governmental organizations around the world and also includes mission 
statements and establishment dates. 
Each data source (Encyclopedia, Directory and Yearbook) has widely recognized 
limitations, and we acknowledge that even when these directories are considered together, they 
do not capture the full range of global environmental enforcement organizations since some 
organizations may have been founded and then disbanded before they were captured in any 
database or directory. Moreover, under-represented INGOs that do not appear in these directories 
are likely to be more radical, less formalized and short-lived. Still, there is also considerable 
overlap in data sources and organizations that do show up in these directories.6 As a result, we 
recognize the listings of organizations are not perfect, but that they likely are an adequate 
reflection of trends in the global culture of environmental enforcement.  
To determine which of these organizations could be classified as environmental 
enforcement INGOs we first identified all organizations that fell under ‘environment,’ 
‘conservation,’ and ‘natural resources.’ Each organization’s mission statement in each of these 
categories was examined by two researchers to see if the organization could be classified as an 
                                                 
6 We are not the first to use these particular data sources to answer questions about INGOs. For instance, Longhofer 
and Schofer (2010) draw upon both the Encyclopedia and the Directory to examine the founding of environmental 
organizations across countries, and Boli and Thomas (1997) draw upon the Yearbook to look at the growth of 
INGOs. 
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environmental enforcement INGO. A total of 263 EE-INGOs were selected using this coding 
process. Inter-coder agreement was 95%. Thus, despite the relatively subjective nature of the 
enforcement definitions and coding procedure, there was high agreement about which 
organizations engaged in some type of environmental enforcement. 
For the purposes of this research we defined an organization as an EE-INGO if it 
described itself as engaging in traditional enforcement operations or claimed to focus on 
changing laws or enforcement practices by influencing state actors.7,8 When counting INGOs we 
did not include governmental organizations (such as state environmental enforcement agencies) 
and only counted multi-country listings one time according to the INGO’s headquarters location 
and description, since the same organization often appeared in multiple directories for multiple 
years. Thus, local chapters of organizations (such as Greenpeace) were not counted when the 
Greenpeace headquarters organization was counted. This prevented the double counting of 
organizations that had local operations in multiple countries. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study represents the annual number of EE-INGOs 
founded. For each year (n=61) in the dataset we count the number of EE-INGOs formed in that 
                                                 
7 The definition of INGOs is contested, and some organizations that are INGOs may be included or excluded despite 
satisfying the definition of an INGO. We examine the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society as a test case 
(www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are). James F. Jarboe of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2002) suggests that 
this organization is engaged in ‘eco-terrorist’ activities. However, Sea Shepherd reports on its website that it seeks to 
‘expose and confront illegal activities on the high seas.’ Despite these varied descriptions of this particular INGO it 
is listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations as an INGO founded in 1977 (see 
http://www.uia.org/s/or/en/1100051655) and is therefore included in our sample. But the extent to which our 
findings reflect the contested nature of INGOs is open to debate (Willetts 2010). 
8 We identify operations INGOs as those organizations that carry out international, national, state, or local legal 
actions (civil or criminal) to enforce environmental laws, rules, regulations or agreements and/or obtain penalties or 
criminal sanctions for violations. This includes monitoring efforts. INGOs may also provide direct aid (in the form 
of resources or monitoring for environmental violations) to state or other governmental agencies that carry out 
environmental protection efforts.’ We define advocacy and lobbying organizations as those that lobby governments 
(international, national, state or local) for the creation of environmental laws, rules, regulations or agreements and/or 
the enforcement of environmental laws, rules, regulations or agreements. 
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particular year. As noted, EE-INGO founding dates were obtained from information reported in 
organizational directories. To obtain the total number of organizations formed in any particular 
year, we simply counted the number of organizations that reported forming in that particular year 
for the 263 organizations included in our sample. These founding rates are presented in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, EE-INGOs did not develop evenly between the years of 1950 and 
2010. While several organizations existed prior to 1950, the founding of organizations between 
the years of 1950 and 1960 was sporadic. It was not until the early 1960s that EE-INGO 
founding increased; it  then peaked in 1990 and then declined until 2010. Overall, an average of 
3.9 organizations were founded each year between the years of 1950 and 2010.  
Independent Variables 
Ecological Footprint. The independent variable measuring ecological impact is derived 
from the Global Footprint Network (www.footprintnetwork.org). The footprint is ‘a measure of 
how much area of biologically productive land and water an individual, population or activity 
requires to produce all the resources it consumes and to absorb the waste it generates, using 
prevailing technology and resource management practices’ 
(http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/glossary/). For the purposes of this 
study, the footprint is expressed globally as the number of earths needed to keep global 
production sustainable. This statistic represents global consumption and waste absorption 
divided by the earth’s biocapacity in any given year. When total consumption and waste exceed 
biocapacity, the statistic is greater than 1. When biocapacity exceeds consumption, the statistic is 
less than 1. Data on the footprint are available from 1961 to 2010 (n=49) and suggest that the 
world is putting more stress on the biosphere today than it did in the past. Overall, the mean 
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footprint between 1961 and 2010 is 1.19 (std. dev. = 0.19), indicating that global consumption 
and related waste absorption practices greatly exceed what can be produced sustainably. We 
expect that the larger the ecological footprint becomes, the greater the number of environmental 
enforcement INGOs will form in any given year as a response to perceived unsustainable 
production practices. These organizations would then serve as a counterforce to production. 
Gross World Product. World production is measured using the gross world product 
(GWP) as obtained from the Earth Policy Institute Data Center (http://www.earth-
policy.org/data_center/). The gross world product is the combined gross national product of all 
countries. The statistic is standardized in 2010 US dollars and uses purchasing power parity 
(PPP) to make comparisons of relative value across countries. In this study, GWP is expressed in 
trilliions of US dollars. Between 1950 and 2010 the average GWP was $30.9 trillion (std. dev. = 
19.26). We suggest that when production-generated income increases, environmental 
enforcement INGO formation will also increase, since organizations require resources to operate. 
These resources are more likely to be forthcoming when generated income is high, setting the 
stage for venture philanthropy on a global level. 
Organization Density. The neoliberal enforcement culture is measured through EE-
INGO organization density and organization density squared. As noted, density is likely to 
encourage the formation of new organizations as the cultural market for those new organizations 
emerges. However, when a significant number of organizations form they are likely to compete 
for resources in a neoliberal marketplace. Therefore, as the density of organizations increases, 
the formation of environmental enforcement INGOs should decrease since organizations are in 
competition for resources. To measure organization density we record the total number of 
environmental enforcement organizations that exist in any particular year. We limit the count of 
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organizations to those in the same sector (i.e., environmental enforcement INGOs) to maximize 
legitimating and competing effects. As might be expected, INGO density increases over time as 
more organizations are formed. The mean number of EE-INGOs in any given year between 1950 
and 2010 is 123 (std. dev. = 89.4). According to density dependence theory we should observe a 
positive and then a negative association between environmental enforcement INGO density and 
environmental enforcement INGO formation.  
To model the potential for these organizations to be positively and then negatively related 
to environmental enforcement INGO formation we include an independent variable that 
measures density squared. Thus, if the coefficient of organization density is positive and the 
coefficient for density squared is negative then there is some evidence that organization density 
is positively, then negatively, related to the formation of environmental enforcement INGOs.  
Controls. This research examines three global indicators that we believe are theoretically 
important and correlated with the formation of EE-INGOs over time. To be sure, there are many 
reasons for the formation of INGOs, and some, undoubtedly, cannot be captured in an aggregate 
global model of INGO formation. To help correct this bias and provide a better test of the 
ecological footprint, global production and the neoliberal INGO marketplace, we consider four 
control variables that may signal alternative explanations of EE-INGO formation. These controls 
are sometimes noted to be correlated with general rates of INGO founding (e.g., Boli & Thomas, 
1997; Willetts, 2010) and can be obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database (http://data.worldbank.org/). First we consider the potential importance of mobile 
phones. We measure this using the number of mobile telephone subscriptions to a public mobile 
telephone service per 100 people. Cell phone data are available starting in 1980 and may 
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contribute to communication networks that foster the formation of environmental enforcement 
INGOs. 
Second, we consider the potential role of exports of goods and services. That is, INGOs 
are probably more likely to form when interdependence is high. Exports of goods represent the 
value of all merchandise and other market services such as financial, business and government 
that one country provides to another as a percentage of the GWP. These data are available 
starting in 1960. 
Third, we control for the percentage of the world population living in an urban location. 
Urbanization may be important in creating the conditions for INGOs to form since nearly all are 
headquartered in urban areas. 
Finally, we control for education, since education may provide an indicator of necessary 
human capital for the formation of organizations. Education is measured as the percentage of the 
global population classified as students. That is, we control for the percentage of the global 
population enrolled in public and private primary and secondary education institutions, 
regardless of their age. 
Analysis 
Time series methods (regression analysis) are used to analyze the association between 
ecological footprint, GWP, organization density, density squared and INGO founding for the 
years 1950 to 2010. One potential problem with time series data is the presence of 
nonstationarity, a condition that can be identified when distributions change over time. 
Nonstationarity may produce artificially high correlations when variables trend together. 
Because founding steadily increases between 1950 and 1990, and because organization density, 
ecological footprint and gross world product generally increase during the same time period, we 
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‘de-trend’ the data by differencing the dependent and independent variables prior to estimating 
partial slope coefficients. In the case of founding, for example, we subtract the number of 
environmental enforcement INGO foundings in year t from the number of INGO foundings in 
year t-1. Results in Table 1 suggest that the change variables are stationary and unproblematic 
for time series analysis. 
Even after de-trending these data, autocorrelation is a potential problem with them. 
Because Models 1 to 4 suggest potential autocorrelation without additional corrections (Durban-
Watson = 2.50 [Model 1] to 2.85 [Model 4]), we correct for this problem using Prais–Winsten 
regression. Results of that correction are presented in Table 1 and suggest that autocorrelation is 
no longer a problem since all Durban-Watson statistics are close to the ideal value of 2.0 that 
indicates no statistical correlation (i.e., Durban-Watson = 2.01 to 2.13). Importantly, the 
residuals in each of the models appear normally distributed, and multicollinearity does not 
appear to be a problem (i.e., Variance Inflation Factor [VIF] scores in Table 1 do not exceed 5, 
except as might be expected in Model 5 when all variables of interest and controls are included 
in the model and the range of years is restricted to 1970 to 2010). 
[Table 1 About Here] 
We begin by examining ecological footprint, GWP and density separately and together in 
Table 1 (Models 1 to 4). This analysis suggests that there is no correlation between the 
ecological footprint (1961 to 2010), gross world product and INGO founding. That is, there 
appears to be little evidence that ecological degradation influences global environmental 
enforcement culture. As previously noted, this finding may not be surprising as INGO formation 
may be the result of many factors that are unrelated to environmental conditions. Moreover, it 
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may be the case that perceptions about ecological degradation are more important than 
degradation itself. 
Model 2 (Table 1) suggests that income is also uncorrelated with INGO formation. That 
is, the global culture of environmental enforcement does not appear to be a function of 
production-related income when examined in isolation. Models 3, 4 and 5 suggest that 
organization density is positively associated with founding (b = 0.61; 0.90; 1.08), while density 
squared is negatively associated with founding (b = –0.001; –0.002; –0.002) in Model 3. 
Together these variables suggest an inverted-U-shaped association between density and 
founding, indicating that environmental enforcement culture develops in a neoliberal 
atmosphere. Thus, while global EE-INGOs may have initially attracted venture capital to help in 
their formation, it appears that a competitive, neoliberal culture eventually emerged as a negative 
correlation between density and founding developed. That is, within the global market, existing 
EE-INGOs appear to decrease the probability that an additional EE-INGO will form. Thus, there 
is support for the density dependence hypotheses (hypotheses three and four) and for the notion 
that the population of environmental enforcement organizations is in fact constrained by a 
neoliberal global culture. 
Model 4 (Table 1) allows for the simultaneous examination of Ecological Footprint, 
Gross World Product and Density on Founding. That model largely replicates Models 1 to 3, as 
ecological footprint is not a statistically significant predictor of founding while density and 
density squared remain important predictors. One important exception in Model 4 is the 
association between GWP and Founding, which is statistically significant and adds considerable 
explanatory power to the models—suggesting that income may be important in the determination 
of EE-INGO founding when density is controlled. Importantly, a $1 billion annual increase in 
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GWP is associated with an increase of 1.174 additional EE-INGOs. As a result, Model 4 
suggests that while ecological footprint matters little in the formation of EE-INGOs, the growing 
number of existing INGOs may limit founding, while rising global income increases founding. In 
other words, income may matter more than ecology in producing EE-INGOs. The fact that 
income is related to the formation of EE-INGOs provides some support for our second 
hypothesis. However, this association again disappears in Model 5 (Table 1) when controls are 
included in the analysis. Nevertheless, if this correlation is reflective of an actual relationship 
between income and founding, we ask whether a global environmental enforcement culture that 
emerges from production-related income will effectively challenge those conditions that 
produced it. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Criminal justice scholars suggest that environmental enforcement NGOs are important 
actors that deserve additional study. We have contributed to the knowledge in this area by 
examining how these organizations may reflect global culture and why they may have formed. 
Drawing upon arguments presented in the treadmill of production thesis we suggest that 
environmental enforcement INGOs may face significant challenges that serve to produce a 
global neoliberal culture of environmental enforcement. This culture, we argue, could be unable 
to address important forms of environmental crime and deviance across the globe.  
First, we discover that the ecological footprint is not correlated with EE-INGO formation 
and therefore appears to have little to do with the emergence of a global environmental culture. 
The lack of an association between the ecological footprint and EE-INGOs over time is 
interesting because it suggests that a global environmental enforcement culture is not developing 
out of need (even if a need exists). Moreover, we might question whether such actors could 
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challenge the treadmill of production if it does not respond to material conditions in the ecology.  
Second, there is some evidence suggesting that global production-related income or GWP 
is correlated with the formation of EE-INGOs. Admittedly, this association is only significant in 
one of the three models estimated. However, the existence of the correlation in one of the models 
does cause us to question whether a global milieu of production shapes a global environmental 
enforcement culture. If so, this has profound implications for environmental crime, law and 
justice across the globe. For instance, Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg (1996) note that trends in 
economic production may actually empower transnational corporations at the expense of the 
environmental movement. How this happens, however, is open to future examination. We 
believe that criminal justice scholars who study the relationship between the political economy 
and crime are well positioned to examine the potential relationship between production and 
private enforcement institutions in greater detail because it is precisely the influence of capital 
accumulation that they often claim influences the number and form of criminal laws (Lynch, 
Michalowski, & Groves, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2015). 
Finally, we discover a correlation that appears to suggest that INGOs operate in a 
neoliberal market. That is, the initial correlation between density and formation is positive, as we 
predicted based on competitive models of for-profit institutions. However, that association 
changes over time and INGOs appear to begin to operate competitively, in a neoliberal fashion. 
In other words, over time the association between density and formation becomes negative. As a 
result, these correlations suggest that EE-INGOs may follow the traditional density dependence 
model of growth that signals private market competition. This is the exact correlation we might 
expect to observe in a global culture of venture philanthropy. Thus, even if EE-INGOs are not 
constrained by a culture of production that gives rise to those organizations, there are, 
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nevertheless, limits to the numbers of formalized INGOs that can emerge to challenge producers 
and encourage the state to take environmental enforcement actions. Thus, the very nature of 
INGOs within the world political economy will likely limit their intensification and therefore the 
impact they may have on world polity. This leaves states to increasingly follow treadmill 
tendencies by facilitating the expansion of the treadmill of production at a global level. Such a 
finding is, again, consistent with the treadmill of production thesis that proposes that these more 
formalized organizations may not be effective. 
While the current analysis lends significant empirical evidence to the study of global 
environmental enforcement culture, there are limitations to this study. Importantly, the 
organizations we examined are formalized and exclude the informal actors that do not appear in 
directories and encyclopedias. While informal organizations (e.g., most local grassroots citizen 
worker groups) are probably in the best position to challenge the treadmill of production, large 
formalized organizations are probably in the worst. Smaller grassroots organizations may be 
more likely to successfully pressure their own governments to better enforce environmental laws 
and change policy.  
This study drives home the dynamic of a global environmental enforcement culture by 
highlighting the importance of empirical analysis in the study of INGOs as organizations that 
reflect global culture. Still, there is much to be done. While the present analysis adds to the 
emerging research on environmental enforcement INGOs, it only addresses half the puzzle. That 
is, we examine the factors that shape the global environmental enforcement culture, but we 
believe our discussion also raises important concerns about the way these organizations may 
influence the formation of environmental enforcement legislation as well as international 
environmental laws. Specifically, we suggest that future research look at the potential impact that 
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environmental enforcement INGOs can have on the culture of global environmental 
enforcement. 
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Table 1. The effects of ecological footprint, gross world product and density on INGO founding, 
1950–2010; Prais–Winsten autocorrelation adjustment at lag 1 (AR1) regression results 
for first order differences 
===================================================================== 
      Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variable b b b b b 
      (std. error) (std. error) (std. error) (std. error) (std. error) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ecological Footprint   2.49             –21.00 –8.42 
        (18.58)               (19.35)   (28.62) 
Gross World Product       –0.08         1.17*   0.38 
              (0.37)         (0.52)   (1.20) 
Density                 0.61*   0.90*   1.08* 
                    (0.16)   (0.22)   (0.33) 
Density Squared            –0.001* –0.002* –0.002* 
                   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Mobile Phones                           0.24 
                                (0.28) 
Exports                        0.40 
                                (0.69) 
Urban Pop.                      2.49 
                                (9.97) 
Education                     –2.13 
                                (3.60) 
Constant   0.09   0.49 –1.00 –2.71 –3.89 
      (0.42) (0.07) (0.38) (0.88) (4.10) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Durban-Watson   2.12   2.13   2.01   2.11 2.11 
R-Squared   0.01   0.01   0.21   0.29 0.37 
n a,b   49   60   60   49c 40 
Mean VIF -- --   4.36   4.70 6.05 
===================================================================== 
 
* p<0.05 
 
a.   Differencing variables results in a loss of one data point. 
 
b. Data are not available since 1950 for every variable. . Thus, Model 1 examines 1961 to 2010; Models 2 and 3 examine 1950 to 2010; Model 4 
examines 1961 to 2010; and Model 5 examines 1970 to 2010.  
 
c.   When Ecological Footprint is removed from Model 4 then n=60. In that instance, the coefficients and standard errors for the model without 
Ecological Footprint are as follows: Gross World Product = 0.48 (standard error = 0.27; p<0.10); Density = 0.70 (standard error = 0.22; 
p<0.05) and Density Squared = 0.002 (standard error = 0.001; p<0.05). This suggests that the results in Model 4 are not due to including 
Ecological Footprint in the model. 
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Figure 1. Annual number of environmental enforcement INGOs founded, 1950–2010
